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here to mention the challenge to the moral relevance of
species Michael Tooley presents in his seminal essay
on abortion and infanticide and James Rachels'
acknowledgment of the role played by the abandonment
of speciesist prejudice in the development of his views
about euthanasia 2 A serious rethinking of the moral
status of nonhumans seems thus to be a major element
in bioethical reflection.
The second, practical kind of impact bioethics can
have has been the object of some reflection in the
relevant literature. It was eveu said that medicine saved
the life of ethics as a social practice, after the long period
ofmainly theoretical inquiries covering at least the first
sixty years of the twentieUl century. 3 Wi thout going to
such extremes, however, some interesting explorations
of the possible role of bioethical discussions have been
offered. In a recent article, for example, Peter Singer,
starting from the real case of an infant with Down's
syndrome, sketches a sort of ideal bioeUlical debate
which shows how, even if we grant that the basis of
ethical judgments is immune from rational criticism,
ample scope is left for the application of reason and
argument, and accordingly for bioethics to play an
important role in the application of ethics in a largely
secular society.4
Doth these radical features of bioethics-the critique
of humanism and the innovative social function---<:an
be found in The Foundations of Bioethics by Tristram

Since its start, bioethics played an important role in
bringing about change. This happened at two levels:
at the level of theory, through the challenge that many
of the most respected scholars in the field made to the
conventional doctrine of the sanctity of human life;
and at Ule level of practice, through the opportunity it
offers to confront problems in a rational, pluralistic
way, comparing different arguments and different
substantive positions.
At the first level, the discussions about abortion and
euthanasia, leading to the distinction between being
human in a descriptive, biological sense and being
human in an evaluative, philosophical sense (that is,
being rational, autonomous etc.), launched an attack
on the view that has been termed a<; "humanism." As it
has been emphasized, humanism has, so to speak, two
sides: an inclusive one which holds that all humans have
equal moral status, and an exclusive one which holds
that only humans have equal moral status. l The critique
which has been put forward as to the inclusive side led
to a critique of the exclusive side, thus furthering the
revision of the traditional notion of moral community
which animal liberation ethics pursues. While the
evidence of iliis overlapping is wide, it could be enough
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EngelhardtJr. They have, however, undergone a curious
process. While the latter has swollen out of proportion,
to the extent that it has become the core of tbe volume,
tbe fonner has notably shrunk, due to the disappearance
of one of its horns, the critique of the exclusive side of
humanism. It is this particular aspect of Engelhardt's
argument, which enables him to lightheartedly license
not only the employment of millions of nonhumans in
medical practices, but also their use for food and even
sport, the one I want to focus on. To do this, however, I
shall have to deal with the other. Not only, in fact, are
they inextricably interwoven, but it is precisely starting
from his conception of the bioethical arena that
Engelhardt develops his view of the moral status of
nonpersons, both human and nonhuman. One notion is
central to this context, as well as to the whole book: tlle
notion of peaceable community.

and historical. It has to be realized here: in a Western
society which embraces "not only America and
Europe, but societies such as Japan and Taiwan as
well,"(6) and one can imagine that the author, if writing
now, would include the ex-Soviet Union too. And it
has to be pursued now: in a moment when historical
forces "have led to the major institutions of most
democracies no longer being associated in a significant
fashion with an established church."(4) Having
included among the religions of the world also overall
worldviews like Marxism, Engelhardt goes on to say
that a peaceable secular society is characterized by
the absence of any particular religious or moral
orthodoxy imposed by force.
If taken as an actual description of the specific
society he refers to, I do not think this statement matches
reality. It is true that in Western society many areas of
moral life which were once dominated by dogmatic
views are now open to different approaches; but it seems
equally true that the countries in which we live accept
some basic principles in whose defence the resort to
force is accepted---e.g. that taking the life and infringing
the liberty of (at least) adult humans is pril1U1 facie
wrong, while nonhuman lives are expendable. And it
won't do to say that, as the author will argue later, these
are (some) of the few principles a peaceable community
can, indeed should, accept: in this context, this would
simply beg the question. The historical version of the
peaceable community can make sense only in the
restricted meaning of a sub-community, whose
peaceable debates should confine themselves to the
particular spheres of social life that are not covered by
the forced imposition of the society's (basic) moral
orthodoxy. This is not, however, the author's own
interpretation, since his goal is more ambitious.

The peaceable community I: historical
Before starting, it will be useful to give an idea, however
approximate, of the structure of The Foundations of
Bioethics. After putting bioethics in its historical
context and discussing at some length the nature of
ethics, the author gets on to his specific subject with
the enunciation and justification of the two principles
he sees as the basis of bioethics: the principle of
autonomy and the principle of beneficence. Such a
basis is further explained and illustrated in the section
on persons, possessions and state authority and-after
an illuminating digression on the different possible
approaches to disease (evaluative, descriptive,
explanatory etc.)-its implications are explored with
regard to problems like abortion, infanticide, free and
infonned consent, suicide and euthanasia. Finally, the
issue of the "rights to health care" leads the author to
make a rapid incursion into the field of political
philosophy, tackling problems such as justice and
inequality. Where does the peaceable community fits into
this picture? The notion appears at every crucial step in
the argument: but, I shall argue, with different meanings.
"In this volume I will talk of peaceable secular
pluralistic societies so as to indicate societies including
a diversity of moral viewpoints, and enjoying in
addition a freedom of moral opinion without the fear
of repression."(4) This can be considered the first
appearance of the peaceahle community. Both its
fonnulation and its context characterize it in a precise
way: the idea of the peaceable community is concrete
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The peaceable community II: ethical
I shall now try to follow the line of reasoning that
attempts to achieve such a greater goal. This is no easy
task, as the argument is dispersed and seems to appear
and vanish, as a subterranean stream, in different
moments and contexts. The starting point is the alleged
impossibility of justifying a particular moral viewpoint.
In the author's opinion, after the historical failure of
the religious attempt to impose a unitary morality and
the collapse of the Humanistic hope to provide a secular,
general justification of a specific moral viewpoint, we
are forced to accept what he metaphorically calls the
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"polytheistic presumption"-that is, the idea that there
are a number of equally defensible, but quite different,
moral perspectives. Engelhardt supports his point
through a rapid survey of the major secular aUempts to
reach objectivity in ethics, attempts that he rejects in
turn, mainly on the charge of being question begging.
One could quibble with the details of his account, such
as the overlooking of the fact that preference
utilitarianism is a fonn of consequentialism which does
not "need already to know which consequences are
better or worse than others,"(31) or the partially
misleading reference to Henry Sidgwick on the subject
of intuitionism.(33) One could also question the way
he gathers in a single list of allegedly inadequate
"standards in ethics" such different items as characterizations of the etllical such as the reference to the
idea of impartiality, questions in etllics such as the
appeal to the consequences of actions or to natural law,
and theories about ethics such as the claim that moral
principles can be grasped by intuition. Engelhardt's
conclusion is, at any rate, that all concrete moral choices
fail as they already presuppose a particular moral sense,
and iliat such a result could bring us to nihilism, but for
a saving factor: the possibility of creating commonly
accepted procedures. For this to succeed generally,
however, an inescapable procedural basis is needed:
"This basis, if it is to be found at all, will need to be
disclosable in the very nature of ethics itself. Such a
basis appears to be available in ilie minimum notion of
ethics as an alternative to force in resolving moral
controvcrsies."(4l) From the alleged individuation of
a transcendental condition-in the sense of existence
condition-for ilie moral world stems a central role for
consent: the conclusions to the process of ethical
reasoning are iliose that peaceable negotiators have all
agreed to accept. To be a negotiator, one should be selfconscious, rational and in possession of a sense of moral
concern, Le. one should be a moral agent, or a person;
and the community of negotiators is the moral
community,5 or the "inner sanctum of morality" where
ilie transcendental condition for ethics finds expression
in the principle of autonomy, or mutual respect. 6
The picture is starting to take shape. Engelhardt's
claim is twofold: he argues that his conclusion is
inescapable and purely formal. I shall object to both
contentions in turn. While the criticism of the latter
requires that we pursue ilie argument a little further,
the fonner can already be dealt with. Though the author
himself wouldn't agree with this descriptilon~and in
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fact he carefully avoids using the term-what the
attempt to avoid nihilism has produced is something
akin to a version of contractarianism, i.e. of the view
that the demands of morality are fixed by agreement.
Does the argument's premise actually entail this
conclusion? And, in the first place, what exactly is the
premise? Engelhardt's starting point is the alleged
impossibility ofjustifying a particular moral viewpoint.
Such "polytheistic presumption" seems to imply
relativism-Leo the doctrine according to which no
single moral code has universal validity. If it actually
does is, however, difficult to detect. The auilior's
account of the failure of the attempts to assert a
particular moral viewpoint is both theoretical and
factual. It is theoretical when the various methods and
theories in ethics are considered and criticised; and it is
factual when tile "crumbling of the presumed possibility
of a uniformity of moral viewpoint" is linked up with
Lutller's ninety-five thesis,(3) or when we are told that,
whenever we consider a society of fair scope, we will
have a pluralism of moral beliefs. The latter approach
does not entail meta-ethical relativism, as is proved, to
make just one example, by the position of Alasdair
MacIntyre, whose historical account Engelhardt
mentions in support of his own analysis.(9)7lf relativism
is not entailed, it remains possible to hold a universalist
position, that is, to conceive of a particular normative
theory having objective validity; accordingly, not only
the discovery ofa specific procedural basis for ethics,
but also tile general search for it is not "inescapable."
If, on the other hand, the statement of the impossibility
of asserting a universally valid moral viewpoint is
theoretical, what we face is meta-eiliical relativism;
but then, "inescapability" is precluded by ilie very same
doctrine. It is precluded, at least, unless one makes some
assumptions, which transform the pure version of
relativism into a more qualified one. And this is exactly
what Engelhardt does-and admits of doing. In the same
passage in which he acknowledges his debt towards
MacIntyre, he comments: "I, unlike Maclntyre, hold
that there is a vindication for a shred of the
Enlightemnent dream: the rationality of resolving moral
controversies through agreement."(63, n. 48) To assume
the value of agreement (and peace) is to make a choice:
and it is from this choice, and not from relativism, that
the necessity of a procedural basis stems. Engelhardt
himself seems aware of this problem. A few pages after
charging Rawls with circularity, on the grounds that
each specific description of the original position-that
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is, of the hypothetical contracting situation-already
presupposes a theory ofjustice, and thus cannot produce
one, he tries to facc the same difficulty with regard to
his own theory. He writes: "As such, this analysis has
the character of unpacking a tautology. Such circular
reasoning (i.e., reasoning from the notion of ethics as
the enterprise ofresolving moral controversies without
a fundamental recourse to force, to the principle of
respecting the freedom of participants in a controversy
as the basis of ethics) is tolerable if it discloses the
character of a major element of the lives ofpersons."(46)
I don't think the attempted defence can work. The notion
of person is in this context an extraneous, unwarranted
element Which, far from providing justification, is in
need of justification. Without it, Engelhardt's selfcritical remark on circularity stands, clearly
undermining any claim to inescapability.
If the argument is not inescapable, is it at least
purely formal? The adjective Engelhardt uses to
qualify it, "transcendental," is overtly borrowed from
Kant; and other features of the theory, in the first place
the role ascribed to respect for persons and the
attribution of a particular moral status to moral agents,
are remindful of Kantian ethics. Engelhardt is,
however, critical of his great model; and a discussion
of his claims will cast light on the problems with his
theory. The criticism is rather original, given the
frequency of the opposite accusation of formalism:
Kant is charged with "smuggling concreteness" into
what should he a purely procedural framework.
Though Engelhardt focuses on two elements, the
condemnation of suicide and the obligation of
beneficence, I shall not consider his objections to the
former, which has not been taken too seriously
beginning at least from Schopenhauer;8 the critique
of the latter is, on the contrary, of great importance,
as it leads to a detaching from Kant's account of the
moral domain. In brief, Engelhardt claims that Kant's
reliance on a contradiction of the will rather than on a
conceptual contradiction in order to ground a principle
of beneficence shows how beneficence cannot be
generated by a purely formal thesis. Feeling thus
confirmed in his view that, while the principle of
autonomy is connected with procedure, the principle
of beneficence is linked with content, he contrasts the
equation form/universality to the equation content/
particularity, and confines to the realm of subjectivity
a beneficent commitment which is perceived as a
collection of "concrete accounts of virtues and vices"
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and of "different understandings of the good life."
Given its non-procedural character, the principle of
beneficence is weaker than, and subordinate to, the
principle of autonomy; but for tllis very reason it is
not confined to the realm of moral agents. With a
further variation on his dichotomic structure, which
matches the deontological character of respect for
autonomy with the teleological-"and most likely
utilitarian"-character of the obligation of beneficence,
Engelhardt grounds the attempt to secure the maximal
balance of benefits over harms not only for persons,
but also for the entities that inhabit the no-man's-land
outside the moral community.
This marks the collapse of what has been called the
agent/patient parity principle9-the principle that moral
patients must be moral agents-and creates a category
of second-class moral patients. Generically labeled as
animal life, those beings include nonhuman animals and
various human nonpersons, such as zygotes, embryos,
fetuses, infants, the senile and the severely disabled.
The sort and intensity of the duties towards those
beings will vary in relation to a hierarchy based on
their level of consciousness, but not only. In fact, the
principle of beneficence is doubly constrained: first, it
works within the bounds of respecting autonomy;
second, it changes according to the different understandings of different moral agents. Furthermore, given
that persons have a right of preemption on welfare
which discounts the claims of nonpersons, it can
happen that beings at the bottom of the hierarchy are
thrown to its top, and even granted the staws of persons
"in the social sense," only on the grounds of the utility
this yields for actual persons.
Such a changing account of the moral domain at
first sight lays itself open to an internal criticism. The
binary, hierarchical-and somewhat mechanicalview of the moral life Engelhardt embraces collides
Witll the main tenet of his theory, Le. the principle of
respecting the freedom of participants in a moral
controversy. Engelhardt seems to forget that there are
ethical views in which the duty of beneficence, far
from grounding only a secondary committnent, lies at
the core of the moral life. Utilitarianism is an example;
and one of the features of utilitarian theory is that its
constituency includes all sentient beings. Engelhardt's
view would require that utilitarians, faced with a
situation in which they could maximize positive
consequences by relieving the suffering inflicted by a
person to nonpersons-say, animals-refrain from
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doing this in the name of the principle of autonomy.
This would simply llillount to asking them to give up
what they see as their overriding duty, and accordingly
to be immoral on their own view. How can this fit
with respecting the freedom of the participants in
moral controversies?
But the real problem, the one that invalidates the
claim to formalism and discloses the substantive nature
of the theory, is elsewhere. It lies in the subdivision of
the moral domain into two levels. In Kant's theory,
thanks to the agent/patient parity principle, the
principle of autonomy covers the whole constituency.
Kant's argument can be purely formal because the
version of the categorical imperative that is known as
the "formula of the end in itself," which demands that
we treat "humanity, both in [our] own person and in
the person of every other, al ways as an end, never as a
means merely,"IO acts as a side constraint with
reference to all the parties in the moral domain. One
can object to Kant's withholding of any moral
considerability from nonrational beings, or to the
equation he establishes between rational beings and
humans;U but, once such an account is accepted,
respect for persons is really a purely formal
requirement. If, on the other hand, we break the unity
of the moral domain, as it is the case with the doctrine
of the two levels, every formal principle which is
confined to one of them, and does not involve just a
distinctive sort of moral constraint, but a special
weighty one,12 becomes substantive with respect to
the other. This is exactly what happens with
Engelhardt's stratified moral domain. Since the
principle of autonomy and the principle of beneficence
are arranged in lexical order-that is, the first one has
to be fully satisfied before it becomes possible to move
on to the second-and since the parties in the lower
level are not covered by the principle of autonomy,
the claims of the second-class moral patients will
always be overridden by the claims of the members
of the moral community. To put it in other terms, beingowed-respect will directly result in cashing out special
moral status.
Thus, to say that only persons are owed respect is
not simply to provide existence conditions for the
ethical: it is also to advance as ubstantive interpretation
of ethics. The charge of "smuggling concreteness" into
what should have been a merely procedural argument
that was directed against Kant seems more suited to
the one who made it.
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The peaceable community III: political

Contract theories are most often social contract theories,
and the present one constitutes no exception. Engelhardt
clearly states that secular ethics is an enterprise in public
policy making, and behind the question "how can we
establish the moral world?" always lurks the question
"how can we establish a peaceable secular pluralist
society?" Though the book devotes much room to the
discussion of the social and economic features of such
a society, what is relevant here is the underlying
structure, which closely follows the structure of the
moral domain. TIle basic dichotomy is once again easily
detectable: on the universal, objective side, there is the
state, a political association whose members do not
necessarily share a cornmon, concrete view of the good;on the particular, subjective side, there are the different
communities which live on shared, specific moral
perspectives. The procedural focus of the state expresses
itself in securing the mutual respect of persons, Le.
offering the impartial protection of citizens from
murder, robbery, and other unauthorized touchings of
themselves or their property-a property which, on
Engelhardt's view, includes many second-class moral
patients, i.e. nonhuman animals, young children and
"mere human biological organisms."(134) While moral
authority comes from the consent of peaceable moral
agents, basic political authority comes from the implicit
consent of peaceable citizens, interested in being
safeguarded from unconsented-to force. 13 On the other
hand, the lives of those same citizens will take on full
significllilCe only in particular moral worlds-say, the
communities of Orthodox Jews, Texian deists or Black
Moslems-which give instruction regarding peculiar
moral values to pursue.
Being a sort of projection of the ethical construction,
Engelhardt's political theory shares most of its
difficulties. The different character of the political
context, however, alters their impact. In particular, since
in social and political life, as contrasted to the ethical
sphere, we are prepared to give up some of our demands
in favour of the results of "a decision procedure which
represent[s] a fair compromise between competing
claims to power,"14 the idea of the priority of generally
agreed-on rules over more local claims becomesalthough with some important provisos-plausible. The
political framework can also cast some light on the
peculiar fact that, though no clear differentiation
between "ethical" and "moral" is proposed, Engelhardt
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defines ethics as the enterprise of resolving moral
controversies: if correlated with the existence of the
particular moral worlds described above, such definition
acquires a precise meaning.
This very meaning, however, points out further
problems. The focus on moral controversies is made
possible by the fact that fundamental nonmoral problems
are tackled by the state through basic protection from
murder, robbery, and other unauthorized touchings. But
which beings are so protected? Only persons-the
second-class moral patients being debaned from the side
constraints which apply in the moral community, and
accordingly from the protective scope of the law. As the
role of warrantor of respect for persons played by political
authority is expressed in protecting innocent persons 15
from assault as well as from interference, not only
nonhuman animals, but also human nonpersons are left
at the mercy of the particular moral worlds-though
Engelhardt manages to avoid the most unpopular
outcomes of his theory through the notion of social
person. The application of this doctrine, usually confined
to nonhuman animals, to members of our species has the
effect of emphasizing a fundamental problem, which
occurs both in the political domain and in the moral one.
In neither sphere are persons-even supposing that they
are the only f1wral or political agents-the only agents, 16
and itis difficult to see why (qualitied) nonmoral freedom
from interference should be a priori accorded only
contingently on (qualified) moral freedom from
interference. Engelhardt's explanation seems to be that
persons being the source of moral values, they are the
existence condition for the peaceable community.
However, this does not mean that they are the only
members of such community, or the only beings which
have ultimate value (and which should accordingly be
unconditionally protected). To say this would amount to
confusing how the values of an ethic are to be achieved
with what is to be achieved by such an ethic. 17 Engelhardt
appears to mingle, once again, formal and substantive.
Though the moral capacity, and accordingly the entities
which possess it, play an essential role in a purely formal
thesis about values, the thesis that only moral agents have
ultimate moral standing is not a purely fonnal thesis about
values. Rather than supplying existence conditions for
all claims about values, it advances one such claim. It is
therefore a substantive thesis about the beings that have
ultimate value or moral standing. ls If, consequently,
selective protection for persons is not warranted by tlle
argument from moral agency, different reasons must be
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offered for Engelhardt's radically dichotomic political
doctrine to stand.

Conclusion
I have argued that the structure of the peaceable
community, be it historical, ethical or political, is deeply
flawed. If my arguments are sound, Engelhardt's
foundations cannot sustain the overgrown framework
into which the social context of bioethical debate has
developed. Accordingly, his particular appeal to the
notion of person-coupled with some subtle
escamotages about human nonpersons-{:annot justify
a view which entails in the concrete the forsaking of
any critique of the exclusive side of humanism. It seems
that a discussion of the moral status of the countless
nonhumans which are employed in biomedical practice,
as well as in any other practice socially sanctioned by
discrimination based on species, deserves from a book
of ethics something more than a few dismissing lines
out of nearly four hundred pages.
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